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"THE LAW MUST BE STABLE,
BUT IT MUST NOT STAND STILL."
Dean Roscoe Pound
On April 11, 1967, the United States Supreme Court extended
the foundations of anti-trust legislation into the field of conglom-
erate mergers. This transitional decision followed logically from
prior decisions. A case used transitionally to expand the law gen-
erally has overtones and shadows of both the area from which
it endeavors to move and the area which it intends to reach
eventually. The case of Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and
Gamble Co.1 fits the above description.
The Supreme Court stated that "this merger may most ap-
propriately be described as a 'product extension merger' ".2 A
product extension merger may, however, exist in the horizontal,
vertical, or conglomerate merger. The Procter and Gamble de-
cision had sufficient evidence to suggest that it was a conglomerate
merger.
The reasoning followed by the Supreme Court was not based
upon Procter's involvement in any specific acts considered illegal
in anti-trust law, nor was the combination of Clorox and Procter
considered illegal per se. The Court relied instead upon the con-
tention that the "acquisition may substantially lessen competition
or create a monopoly in the production of household liquid
bleaches." 8 Herein lies the ground upon which the Supreme
Court exercised its judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in such
cases has not generally lacked evidence on which to base its reason-
1. 1. 886 U.S. 568 (1967).
2. Federal Trade Commission v. Procter and Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 570 (1967).
3. Id.
NOTES
ing, but inconsistent results have been reached from reliance on
similar evidence.
Few lawyers, economists, or businessmen require that a rigid
standard be set to determine whether or not diversification mer-
gers are illegal. Since over seventy per cent of the total U. S. mergers
in the last six years have been of the conglomerate type 4 it would
be convenient for the interested parties to have some type of guide-
lines to rely upon. This would give the parties some bases to make
merger plans.
HISTORY AND DEFINITION
Efforts to control corporate combinations, prior to the federal
government's attempts, are found in the common law and state
statutory law. The relevant part of the common law is the rule
against agreements in restraint of trade and the ultra vires prin-
ciple. 5 State statutory law tended to be ineffective in general. By
the late nineteenth century only a minority of the states had pro-
visions against restraint of trade.6
After the Standard Oil Trust, in 1879, many other trusts fol-
lowed and, since they were of the interstate variety, the states
found it difficult to cope with the problems they presented. 7 It
was in response to the ineffectiveness of state controls that the
Federal Government entered the anti-trust field. The Sherman
Anti-trust Act, passed in 1890, used general language to prohibit
restraint of trade by trusts. 8 This general language limited its
effectiveness until 1894 when the language was given more def-
inite content. 9
Twenty-four years later, in 1914, the Clayton Anti-trust Act
was passed to supplement the still inadequate Sherman Act. This
Act prohibited such practices as price discrimination, tying con-
tracts, interlocking directorates, and the acquisition of stockholdings
tending to lessen competition. ° Section Seven of the Clayton Act
is important to the present-day conglomerate merger. The pert-
inent portion of the original section read as follows:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire,
4. Reily, Conglomerate Mergers--An Argument For Action, 61 NW. U. L. RPv. 522,
629 (1966-1967).
5. "Ultra vires" Central Railroad Company v. Collins, 40 Ga. 583 (1869), Richardson
v. Buhl, 277 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 (1889) (rule against 'agreements in restraint of
trade), Thomaa v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 71 (1879).
6. BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE. TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, (1916).
7. It is not within the scope of this note to include the problems which Individual
states have faced in regard to antitrust regulation. For a brief discussion see C. FITE,
and 1. REEsz, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, (1959) 367-868.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
9. United States v. E. C. Knight Company, 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
10. 15 U.S.C. §1 13, 14, 18, 19 (1964).
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directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital of another corporation engaged also
in commerce where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation
whose stock is so acquired, and the corporation making the
acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce.11
This section remained unchanged until 1950 when it was amended
to read as follows:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire
directly or indirectly the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no corporation subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation en-
gaged in commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion, or to tend to create a monopoly.12
One of the changes made by the 1950 amendment was the specify-
ing of the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction. Another
change in Section Seven concerns the removal of the words, "or
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce," from the
original Act and the insertion of the words, "or tend to create a
monopoly," in the amended version. Before the amendment of
Section Seven of the Clayton Act in 1950, it had generally been
supposed that the statute applied only to horizontal mergers. 13
However, one of the main purposes of the amendment of Section
Seven was to make the law clearly applicable "to all types of
mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as
horizontal.""4 A perhaps more important purpose of the change
in Section Seven was the Congressional intent to make "legislation
extend to acquisitions which were not forbidden by the Sherman
Act.' 5 Particular stock acquisitions substantially reduced compe-
tition and it was this "assets loophole" that Congress attempted
to close by amending Section Seven.1 6
It was the 1950 amendment that allowed the United States
Supreme Court to use its discretion to determine what conditions
"may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a mono-
poly." The Court used discretion in anti-trust decisions prior to
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18, (1964).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18, 1964).
18. I.R REP. Doc. No. 169, 84th Cong., ]at Sess. 168 (1955).
14. ut. am. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
15. S. Rzp. No. 1775 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950) 4.
16. H.IRL RzP. No. 1191 supra note 14 at 1.
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1950 but the more liberal wording in the 1950 amendment permits
a significantly greater degree of discretion. Early anti-trust leg-
islation was designed to eliminate certain economically-harmful
acts, such as price fixing. Later, as the Courts recognized the
inherent undesirability of monopoly power, it gradually formulated
a standard which extended the scope of anti-trust prohibitions.-
At present there are fairly clear guidelines for horizontal and
vertical mergers. If a businessman wishes to improve his com-
pany's economic position by a diversification merger, however, he
will have no clear guidelines to follow. Because of the fuzzy area
of decisions in conglomerate mergers, the merging company can
only estimate the degree to which a particaul merger will lessen
potential competition or tend to create a monopoly. In many cases
the only way to determine what the Courts will decide, is to merge.
The company many obtain a premerger opinion from the Federal
Trade Commission but even this will not protect the company.18
The present concern is caused by the importance that this
type of merger plays in today's economy. The conglomerate mer-
ger has been relatively free from litigation, but because of the
recent decision in Procter and Gamble, businessmen are looking
for a standard or guideline upon which they can base their future
merger plans. This problem is even more serious for those com-
panies which are oligopolistic in nature. The oligopolistic industry
has a few dominant firms and any acquisition, in a related area,
can potentially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
For this reason the oligopolistic firms have a special need for
judicial guidelines to refer to when they consider what areas they
may diversify into.
The conglomerate merger has been defined as "all other"
than horizontal and vertical mergers. 1 This then eliminates from
the conglomerate merger definition those mergers which are be-
tween companies performing similar functions in the production or
sale of comparable goods or services and those mergers which are
between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship.2
The most accepted definition of the conglomerate merger is a
merger "between companies that do not compete directly nor
stand in a buyer-seller relationship.' 21 Another suggested defini-
tion is that the conglomerate merger is nothing definite but merely
a method by which Congress could " . . . encompass a category
17. Brodley, Oligopoly Powert Under the Sherman and Clayton Aote. From onofloto
Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. T. RiV. 285, 287 (1967).
18. 16 C.F.R. § 1.53 (Supp. 1967).
19. Blair, The Conglomerate Merger In Economica and Law, 46 GQo. L. J. 672 (1958).
20. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 823 (1961).
21. Turner, Conglomerate Merger and Section Seven o the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. I.
Ray. 1813, 1814-1815 (1965).
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of mergers other than the traditional horizontal and vertical mer-
gers. ' 22 This last formulation may be the most appropriate in
view of the growth of anti-trust litigation. The definitional ques-
tion is complicated by the fact that in Procter and Gamble the
Supreme Court accepts a definition of the conglomerate merger
which is different from any of the foregoing. The Court defines
the conglomerate merger as " . . . one in which there is no
economic relationships between the acquiring and acquired firm."2 3
This, however, is a pure economic theory that, if narrowly ap-
plied, would exclude many mergers now considered conglomerate.
Even though the Supreme Court called Procter and Gamble
a product-extension case, the facts show that the case could be
included within the category of conglomerate mergers. Clorox and
Procter did not stand in a buyer-seller relationship, nor did the
two companies compete directly with one another. The case does
not, however, come within the pure-theory definition of the Court.
There is disagreement within the Federal Trade Commission
as well as within the federal courts as to what aspects of the
merger are to be restricted. Embodied in the contention that the
merger does not sufficiently prohibit competition is the unresolved
issue of what evidence is to be used to determine the potentiality
of restricting competition.
The initial decision against Procter was issued by a hearing
examiner who found that the "acquisition violated Section Seven
of the Clayton Act and ordered divesture."' The Commission,
however, remanded the decision with an order to consider post-
merger evidence.2 5 This order was complied with, but when the
Commission heard the reargument it concluded, based on the
Section Seven language, that any decision must be based on the
entire record and not the post-merger evidence alone.28 Based
upon this conclusion, the Commission upheld the second initial
hearing with only minor changes.2 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set
aside and remanded the decision of the Federal Trade Com-
mission's second hearing.28 The Appeals Court had difficulty with
the results obtained within the Federal Trade Commission.
The Appeals Court, although referring to the questions of big-
ness, potential competition, and competitive effects, felt that the
primary evidence used to reverse the Federal Trade Commission
22. W. A.LwnTS and 3r. SEGALL, THE COUPORATE MMGMM (1966) 85.
28. 386 U.S. at 677 n2.
24. Trade Cas. (CCH) 82, 178 [1966) (6th Cir. 1966).
25. Id. at 82, 179.
26. Ld.
27. Id.
28. Procter and Gamble v. Federal Trade Commission 858 F.2d 74, 75 (6th Cir. 1966).
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decision was the post-acquisition evidence. 29 The Appeals Court
believed that the post-acquisition evidence showed that there were
neither anti-competitive effects nor any significant changes in the
market.30
The final decision concerning the Procter and Clorox merger
was reversal of the Court of Appeals and enforcement of the Com-
mission's order. The Supreme Court concluded that post-merger
evidence could not be considered because the words "may lessen
potential competition" are not equivalent to "will lessen competi-
tion". To show that a merger "may lessen potential competition",
only the possibility must be established. Actual reduction in com-
petition shown or rebutted by post-merger evidence is irrelevant.
Other support for the conclusion, that the merger may lessen
potential competition, was drawn more from anti-trust policy than
from a strict interpretation of facts. The Court took into account
the following in making their decision: The problem of determ-
ining the relevant markets and possible anti-competitive effects;
the necessity of restraining any anti-competitive effects at their
incipiency; and whether or not the issue of economics can be
raised as a defense.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Procter and Gamble, attempted
to give the businessman and lawyer some guidelines for determ-
ining the legality of a prospective merger. 31 This attempt is use-
ful, but at most it can only suggest what the Court may decide
in the future.
Even though the Supreme Court used broad language in hold-
ing the merger illegal, it will probably rely upon this reasoning
when faced with the next conglomerate merger. Because of this
reliance, certain guidelines which the Court set out will become
important as justifications for holding future mergers legal or
illegal.
ECONoMIc EVIDENCE USED IN MERGER GUIDELINES
Judicial determination, in anti-trust decisions, generally de-
pends upon the available economic evidence and how it is applied.
Procter and Gamble stated that the following economic evidence
was important.
Suggested Guidelines in F.T.C. V. Procter and Gamble:
1. Relevant Markets.
2. Anti-competitive Effects.
29. Id. at 82, 88.
80. 1&. at 80, 83.
SL 386 U.S. at 581-68, paeasm (concurring opinion).
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3. Restraining Anticompetitive Mergers at Incipiency.
4. Inability of Raising Economies as a Defense.
The above standards are not new to anti-trust litigation nor do
they vary from those used in horizontal or vertical mergers. The
explanation for this continuity in the guidelines is that the Court
is applying tested standards to a new group of mergers.
The Supreme Court, in order to determine whether or not anti-
competitive conditions exist, looked to what product and geograph-
icial markets are involved. The Court stated in Procter and Gam-
ble that the relevant line of commerce was based on the nature of
the product.8 2 Their reasoning was based upon the concept of the
distinctiveness of the product.38 However, this reasoning was
distinguished by the Supreme Court when it stated that "a pro-
duct would not be a market merely because it differs from other
products; instead the Court called for an appraisal of the 'cross
elasticity' of demand in the trade. ' '8 " The Court further stated
that
[Tihe market which one must study to determine when a
producer has monopoly power will vary with the part of
commerce in consideration. The tests are constant. The mar-
ket is composed of products that have interchangeability for
the purposes for which they are produced. Price, use and
quality are considered. 85
DuPont can be distinguished but nevertheless the Court is left with
two alternatives to choose from. What would determine whether
or not the product was distinctive enough to be a relevant mar-
ket by itself? Would the products have to be pyhsically alike,
would they necessarily have to have the same final use, or would
the ability of one to find a near substitute be sufficient to remove
the label of distinctiveness? All three distinctions listed have been
offered as exceptions to the rule of distinctiveness."
Another aspect of the relevant market test which the Supreme
Court is concerned with is the geographical market. In Procter
and Gamble the geographical market was " . . . the nation and
a series of regional markets." 87 This was justifiable because Clo-
rox dominated the national liquid bleach market.8
$2. Id. at 571.
a3. Zd.
34. United States v. Du Pont and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
35. Id. at 404.
36. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (191;4); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962); United States v. B. I. Du Pont de Nernours
and Co., 68 U.S. 586. 593-594 (1967).
87. 886 U.S. at 571.
as. Id-
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The question of what is a relevant geographical market has
been approached in several ways. In United States v. Pabsts Brew-
ing Co. the Court said a geographical market was " . . . any
section of the United States . . . " that experienced a substantial
anti-competitive effect because of a particular merger.3 9
The Pabsts decision was supported by another recent case
in which the Supreme Court stated that a geographical market is
that market the company in question operates in.0
An alternative to this approach was taken by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank when it stated
that the inquiry to the relevant market was not
where the parties to the merger do business, or even where
they compete, but where, within the area of competition
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct
and immediate."
The Court has also said that "the geographical market selected
must therefore both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the
industry and be economically significant. ' 4 2
The Court's guideline concerning relevant markets in Procter
and Gamble is broadly stated and when there is an attempt to
find a more rigid standard, it is complicated by the many vari-
ations which the Court allows. Even if one allows for the dis-
tinctions in the cases, there is little left upon which the prospec-
tive merger may rely.
Another aspect which the Supreme Court used as a guideline
in the Proctor and Gamble case was that there was a prob-
ability of lessening potential competition. This particular guide-
line allows the Court a good deal of discretion in deciding if po-
tential competition is lessened. This guideline is primarily a stand-
ard in regard to market structure.
The Supreme Court in Procter and Gamble contended that the
anti-competitive aspects caused by the merger were the following:
(1) the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the
smaller, but already dominant, firm may substantially re-
duce the competitive structure of the industry by raising
entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from
aggressively competing.'8
39. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 884 U.S. 546, 549 (1965).
40. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 568, 575 (1965).
41. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 874 U.S. 211, 357 (1962).
42. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 386-7 (1961).
43. 386 U.S. at 578.
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(2) the acquisition eliminates the potential competition of
the acquiring firm."
The United States Supreme Court pointed out that the liquid bleach
market was oligopolistic with Clorox enjoying the dominant po-
sition and that if Procter were allowed to enter the market, the
entry by acquisition would very likely be in monopolistic propor-
tions.4 5 The Court, depending upon the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, stated that if Procter were allowed into the field of liquid
bleach there would be a great disparity in size among the firms
in the relevant market.4 6 This disparity, it was asserted, would
greatly change the competitive structure of the liquid bleach mar-
ket as well as the other markets that Procter was involved in.-
Clorox could be used to expand retail markets. For instance,
Clorox bleach could be used " . . . as a tying product, loss leader
or cross-coupon offering, in connection with efforts to promote
other Procter products."'4" The Court maintained that one of the
advantages gained by Procter, because of the disparity in size,
would be that the many regional producers would not compete
nearly as aggressively because of fear of retaliation.4 9
Along with promotional benefits there was the added advantage
of Procter maintaining its own sales staff.50 The Procter sales-
men promote only one brand and devote a good deal of attention
to maintaining and displaying their products. The independent
broker does not generally have this interest in any one of the
many products he promotes. Finally, Procter may be able to
gain extra shelf space by offering the merchant a better resale
profit margin. This type of promotion can only be carried out by
a financially-sound company. It must have sufficient reserves on
which it can rely if necessary. Procter was this type of company.
The item most obviously related to disparity among the num-
erous firms was advertising. The Supreme Court used advertis-
ing to demonstrate how the disparity in size was advantageous to
Procter. The Court pointed out that Procter could devote its entire
advertising budget to defend Clorox from a new company attempt-
ing to enter the liquid bleach market.51 Another advantage Clorox
would receive was that it would receive broader consumer ex-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The Procter and Gamble Company, No. 6901 (FTC, Nov. 26, 1963) 57.
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id.
49. 386 U.S. at 578.
50. The Procter and Gamble Company, No. 6901 (FTC, Nov. 26, 1963) 46.
51. 386 U.S. at 579.
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posure.5 2 Finally, Clorox would receive the reduction given Procter
for its mass advertising, such as:
The maximum annual volume discounts available to the
largest advertisers amount to twenty-five to thirty per cent
for network television advertising and somewhat smaller
but still substantial percentages, for magazine, newspaper,
and radio advertising. In addition, the discount rates avail-
able for local "spot" television advertising favor the large
advertiser.58
These discounts were not obtainable by Clorox as an independent
producer of liquid bleach.
The final aspect of disparity in size was the ability of Procter
to engage in predatory pricing and/or price leadership." The
Court was vague in this regard, but the Commission contended
that Procter could, although not intentionally, have unfair and des-
tructive advantage because of its pricing policy. 5 Procter may
be able to maximize its profit by selling Clorox at a lower price
than that which other liquid bleach manufacturers could profitably
sell.
A concern that produces many products and operates
across many markets need not require a particular market
as a separate unit for determining business policy and need
not attempt to maximize its profits in the sale of each of
its products as has been presupposed in our traditional
scheme. 56
Another influence, caused by price leadership, is the tendency of
selling at prices higher than those obtainable under a competitive
system. This is usually caused by the failure of the small com-
petitor to aggressively compete with its bigger rival.
The second anti-competitive aspect of the Procter-Clorox mer-
ger was the elimination of potential competitors who acquired the
firm.57 In this case Procter was considered the most likely en-
trant into the liquid bleach line of commerce. The basis for this
reasoning was that Procter was looking for areas of diversififcation;
Procter was financially capable of entering into this area; the
marketing process was similar to Procter's; the same customers
were to be reached; equipment for production was available; and
the necessary manufacturing information was available.58 The
52. The Procter and Gamble Company, No. 6901, (FTC, Nov. 26, 1963) 44-6.
53. Id. at 44.
54. 386 U.S. at 578.
55. The Procter and Gamble Company, No. 6901, (FTC. Nov. 26, 1963) 48.
56. Id. at 48-9.
57. 886 U.S. at 578.
58. I& at 580.
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Court concluded, contrary to Procter's opinion, that because it was
relatively easy for Procter to enter the market, the other firms
were cautious in their pricing policies. 9 This seemed to indicate
that if profits were too lucrative, Procter would then enter the
market.
The Court concluded, from the potential anti-competitive ef-
fects, the merger would raise new barriers to competition in the
liquid bleach market. 60 With Procter in the market the smaller
firms would face the increased advertising and financial power
of Procter. Another area which faced a greater barrier was the
area of other possible entrants. Because of Procter's commanding
position, any entrant would have to compete with the large re-
sources of Procter if it wanted a portion of the market. 61
The previous anti-competitive effects are restricted to the case
discussed. Because, however, the Court took a broad approach for
holding such a merger illegal, the reasons presented should at
least have value as factors to which future mergers will be com-
pared.
The broad reasoning allows a wide latitude for the exercise
of the court's discretion. It is this discretion which causes the
variation in decisions and, as a result, confusion in the merger
field.
Another guideline discussed in Procter and Gamble was the
interpretation of Section Seven of the Clayton Act. The Court
maintained that the Section " . . . was intended to arrest the
anti-competitive effects in their incipiency."6 2
In another case the Supreme Court stated Section Seven was
to apply to all mergers "whose effect may tend to lessen com-
petition in any line of commerce in any section of the country." 683
The Court continued by saying that Congress was attempting to
stem the tide of continuing economic concentration. 64 In at least
two instances the Supreme Court declared that Section Seven dealt
with probable anti-competitive effects and not with certainty.6 5
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank also supported this
reasoning.66 When the Court uses this interpretation, the post-ac-
quisition evidence is of little value for the merging companies to
help justify their merger.
The final guideline arrived at in this case was the uselessness
59. Id. at 581.
60. Id. at 579.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 577.
63. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294, 317 (1961).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 323, United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1963).
66. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1962).
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of the merging company to supply evidence of possible economies
to justify any proposed merger. The Court has decided that
economies could result, depending on the facts of the case, if
particular mergers were allowed, however, the Court in this
case decided to protect competition instead.67 In making this de-
cision the Court relied on its reasoning in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States when it stated that decentralization was more im-
portant than resulting economies.68
The Court in Procter and Gamble did not make its reasoning
specific and therefore the Federal Trade Commission's decision
has some value. The Commission suggests that some economies
could be raised as a defense if they promoted competition. 9 The
acquisition of a failing company by a solvent company could pro-
mote competition. The merger of two small plants might also
create economies in production and distribution which would in-
crease competition. Finally, when all economic evidence is com-
piled and reviewed, the Court can either decide upon the economic
evidence alone, or it may balance the economic evidence against
other interests. While the comparison is made, it is the result
of the exercise of judicial discretion.
One issue which the Court has generally used is that of mar-
ket concentration. Because of the growth of economic concen-
tration, the courts have made an attempt to arrive at some form
of equality regarding competition and concentration. Early in anti-
trust litigation, a preference developed for " . . . a system of
small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill
and character."70 All the anti-trust policies had this preference
fused into their goals. Because of the preference, the Courts can-
not rely fully upon economic evidence but must balance such evi-
dence with numerous political and social considerations. It is in
this position that the Court's interpretation becomes important in
measuring what considerations will be the determining factors con-
trolling future mergers.
CONCLUSION
Procter and Gamble issued several possible guidelines which
future entrants to conglomerate mergers must consider before
making a final judgment on diversification plans. The primary
question concerning all those interested in this merger is what
value do the present guidelines have? The prior discussion demon-
67. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1961).
68. Id.
69. The Procter and Gamble Company, No. 6901, (PTC, Nov. 26, 1968) 64-5.
70. Bock and Bowman, The Criaa Iu AuftfIat, 65 COLUM. ". IXV. 862, 869 (1966).
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strates the lack of constant rules or standards for the conglom-
erate merger.
This particular form of merger is especially conducive to prob-
lems of interpretation since it is a relatively unlitigated area.
This causes problems of definition and explanation. Judges must
attempt to define what areas the conglomerate merger will en-
compass. It is also the duty of the Courts to explain how various
policies apply to different cases. At the present time this is im-
portant because the Court has not settled upon definite guidelines.
This lack of guidelines causes the extreme holdings in merger
decisions. The area of relevant markets is a particularly clear
example of this divergence.
The lack of continuity in the decisions seems to be derived
from the fact that the judges are unsure of this new area. Rea-
soning applied in one fashion to one case may not be applicable
to a similar but distinguishable set of circumstances. It cannot
be said that all the decisions which deviate from one another are
wrong, but they do lend themselves to a good degree of inconsist-
ency within the conglomerate picture. Once the Court has had
the opportunity of deciding several cases in a particular area
there will be a definite set of guidelines to follow. Until then,
early generalizations as to conglomerate guidelines will be mis-
leading.
Judicial discretion is most obvious when confronted with a case
that puts economic evidence at odds with social policy. As men-
tioned In the discussion above, there is a desire to save compe-
tition. Recent merger decisions have attempted to apply this to
balancing the economic evidence presented. The result of this
desire seems to have been that courts will attempt to restrict
concentration from destroying the small competitor. The courts
have yet to articulate what degree of concentration will be al-
lowed. From the available evidence, what degree of concentration
will be allowed will depend upon the market structure within the
industry where the merger is attempted. Since the courts tend to
be in a transition it would be safe to assume that judicial dis-
cretion will continue to be used in future merger decisions.
If a conglomerate merger is still desired certain factors should
be considered. The corporation should, if it has a strong market
position, stay away from related market areas, unless the acquisi-
tion will constitute a minor portion of the new market and even
this will depend upon market conditions.72 If the corporation is
71. UWted States v. Von' Grooery Co., $84 U.S. 270 (19 6).
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large, relative to the competitors in the new industry, any involve-
ment could be grounds for creating anti-competitive effects.
The confusion in the new area of litigation is expected and
until guidelines are solidified the law will, by necessity, make more
merger decisions based, to a great deal, on judicial discretion.
For this reason future attempts at mergers by prospective candi-
dates must be made slowly and with considerable analysis of the
surrounding conditions.
LARRY BAKKEN

